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ABSTRACT 
Introspection is a fundamental part of our mental lives. Nevertheless, its re-
liability and its underlying cognitive architecture have been widely disputed. 
Here, I propose a principled way to model introspection. By using time-
tested principles from signal detection theory (SDT) and extrapolating them 
from perception to introspection, I offer a new framework for an introspec-
tive signal detection theory (iSDT). In SDT, the reliability of perceptual judg-
ments is a function of the strength of an internal perceptual response (signal-
to-noise ratio) which is, to a large extent, driven by the intensity of the stim-
ulus. In parallel to perception, iSDT models the reliability of introspective 
judgments as a function of the strength of an internal introspective response 
(signal-to-noise ratio) which is, to a large extent, driven by the intensity of 
conscious experiences. Thus, by modelling introspection after perception, 
iSDT can calibrate introspection’s reliability across a whole range of contexts. 
iSDT offers a novel, illuminating way of thinking about introspection and 
the cognitive processes that support it. 
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The study of introspection has a thorny history. Introspection has 
been praised as an infallible capacity, vilified as utterly unreliable, and 
everything else in between. How can this be? How can there be such 
a dispute about the trustworthiness of one of our most important ca-
pacities? To make progress around these disputes, a successful theory 
of introspection should aim to calibrate its whole range of operation 
and explain its reliability conditions: when and why it succeeds and 
when and why it fails.  
My goal here is to provide a new framework for explicating and 
calibrating introspection. To do so, I will take conceptual and theoret-
ical insights from the science of perception— in particular, from signal 
detection theory (SDT)—and extrapolate them to model first-personal 
access to conscious experiences as a type of signal detection. I call the 
result of this model extension ‘introspective Signal Detection Theory’ 
(iSDT). The main aim of introducing the iSDT framework is to help 
us conceptualise introspection in a more systematic way than previous 
approaches have typically allowed. This new theoretical apparatus can 
handle a wider range of cases (both successes and failures) by appeal-
ing to a single machinery whose fundamental underlying operation is 
shared by other cognitive capacities (perception, memory and deci-
sion-making, among others). In addition to calibrating introspection’s 
whole range of reliability, iSDT also offers a unifying way of under-
standing response bias and confidence in introspective judgments. In 
brief, by offering a functional analysis of the psychological principles 
under which introspection operates, a fruitful sketch of how to model 
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its reliability and the computational mechanisms that support it will 
emerge. 
Science can make progress by applying familiar, well-understood 
concepts and models from one domain to unfamiliar, less well-under-
stood concepts and models in a different domain. This phenomenon 
is known as ‘model template transfer’ (Humphreys [2002]; Knuuttila 
and Loettgers [2016]) or, more generally, ‘model migration’ (Lin 
[2018]). Beyond mathematical and computational structures, model 
templates are useful for the conceptual resources they provide; in fact, 
model templates ‘enable cross-disciplinary transfer, sensitizing us to 
perceive similar patterns across wide variety of different kinds of em-
pirical systems […]. [T]hey offer resources for further investigation 
and new theoretical insights’ (Knuuttila and Loettgers [2016], p. 298).  
One of the most successful cases of model migration is Maxwell’s 
([1861]) successful transformation of Faraday’s mechanical model of 
fluids to explain electromagnetic fields. Recent examples include the 
extension of game-theoretic models to evolutionary decision-making 
(Smith and Price [1973]) or the extension of tools developed for un-
derstanding the random motion of suspended particles for modelling 
financial markets (Merton [1969]; Samuelson [1969]). In psychology, 
the most influential model extension is, without a doubt, signal detec-
tion theory. Originally developed during the first half of the twentieth 
century as a mathematical framework for evaluating radar perfor-
mance, SDT was later adapted to explain perception (Tanner [1954]; 
Macmillan and Creelman [2005]). Since then, SDT has been described 
as ‘one of psychology’s most well-known and influential theoretical 
frameworks’ (Wixted [2020], p. 201) and even as ‘the most towering 
achievement of basic psychological research of the last half century’ 
(Estes [2002], p. 15). By taking SDT’s insights and conceptual appa-
ratus to model introspection, we can make progress in a domain that 
has historically resisted satisfactory modelling both in philosophy and 
psychology.1  
                                                 
 
1 Signal detection in general, and SDT in particular, has been successfully applied 
outside the perceptual domain. For a recent elegant use of SDT to model memory, 
see (Schurgin et al. [2020]). 
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In a nutshell, SDT models perception as the joint outcome of per-
ceptual discrimination and decision-making. An observer’s ability to 
discriminate stimuli (called perceptual sensitivity) depends on the 
strength of the perceptual evidence their visual system accumulates. In 
turn, the perceptual evidence (also known as the internal perceptual 
response or perceptual response, for short) tends to be proportional 
to the strength of the stimulus itself. In addition to discriminating the 
stimulus, when making a perceptual judgment, observers make a deci-
sion to classify the perceptual evidence in one way or another. To do 
so, they set a criterion or response rule (also known as response bias) 
to determine the level of internal response required for classifying the 
stimulus. Consider the following simple scenario. Everything else be-
ing equal, an observer is more likely to perceive accurately a person in 
an alley when the alley is well-lit (strong stimulus, strong internal re-
sponse) than when the person is in a dark alley (weak stimulus, weak 
internal response). Moreover, whether the same amount of perceptual 
evidence leads to discriminating or not someone in the alley depends 
on how liberal or conservative the observer’s criterion is.  
The view I introduce here—iSDT—models’ introspection similarly 
to how SDT models perception. Accordingly, iSDT models introspec-
tive judgments as the joint outcome of an introspective discrimination 
and a decision. The central tenet of iSDT is that the intensity of our 
conscious experiences (what I call ‘mental strength’) modulates the in-
ternal introspective response (or introspective response, for short) and 
this, in turn, modulates introspective sensitivity. Thus, iSDT proposes 
that, everything else being equal, an introspector is more likely to in-
trospect accurately an intense experience (a strong pain, a vivid mental 
image, etc.) than a weak experience (a weak pain, a faint mental image, 
etc.). iSDT also relies on introspective response bias to fully account 
for introspective judgments. For example, for an identical weak expe-
rience, a liberal introspector may judge they are undergoing that expe-
rience (a weak pain, a faint mental image, etc.) while a conservative 
introspector may not.  
In section 2, I discuss desiderata for calibrating introspection as well 
as iSDT’s most basic assumptions about the nature of introspection. I 
also discuss iSDT in the context of other theories of introspection, in 
particular other inner-sense theories. In section 3, I offer an overview 
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of SDT, especially notions such as sensitivity, response bias, and con-
fidence. Section 4 introduces the notion of ‘mental strength’ (con-
scious experience intensity) and discusses its connection, on one hand, 
to stimulus intensity and perceptual response, and, on the other hand, 
to introspective response. In section 5, I develop the iSDT framework 
and focus on the introspection of pains as a case study. Finally, in sec-
tion 6, I discuss generalizations of iSDT to introspection of mental 
imagery and perceptual experiences. Furthermore, I show how iSDT 
offers systematic explanations for different types of empirical results 
taken from the scientific study of consciousness. 
 
2 Introspection as a Garden-Variety Capacity 
The problem of calibration ‘arises for any scientific instrument and 
cognitive capacity’ (Goldman [2004], p. 14). Introspection is no excep-
tion. Calibrating introspection requires determining when it works and 
when it does not. Two desiderata for an adequate theory of introspec-
tion emerge. First, it should have the right scope, that is, it should ex-
plain introspection’s full range of reliability. This means that the con-
ditions that favour both accurate and inaccurate introspective judg-
ments should be covered by the theory. Second, a theory of introspec-
tion must be illuminating. This means that the theory not only should 
cover the whole range of relevant cases, but it should also explain why 
introspection has the range of reliability that it has. Everything else 
being equal, it is desirable that this explanation is the same (or of the 
same kind) for successes and failures.2  
These desiderata apply to the calibration of other faculties too. SDT 
is a successful example of a theory that explains perception’s full range 
of reliability in an illuminating way. SDT explains perceptual sensitivity 
by appealing to the signal-to-noise ratio of the internal perceptual re-
sponse, thus covering perceptual sensitivity’s whole range—from 
                                                 
 
2 Failure to meet the ceteris paribus clause would make room for pluralist accounts of 
introspection (Schwitzgebel [2012]; Renero [2019]). 
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chance to performance at ceiling. By appealing to this single principle, 
SDT can explain (and predict!) why perception is good when it is good 
and why it is bad when it is bad. Similarly, a theory of introspection 
should explain (and predict) when accurate and inaccurate introspec-
tion is likely to happen by appealing to a unified principle. iSDT is such 
theory.  
Prima facie, a reasonable assumption when thinking about introspec-
tion’s reliability is that introspection is not unlike the rest of our cog-
nitive capacities.3 Call this the assumption that introspection is a GAR-
DEN-VARIETY capacity. Part of what it means to be a garden-variety 
capacity is that it is not equally reliable in all conditions. Like any of 
our other faculties, introspection may sometimes get things right and 
it may sometimes get things wrong.  
As I understand it here, introspection is the focusing of one’s at-
tention on one’s current conscious experiences to make judgments 
about them.4 Accordingly, we can introspect pains, mental images, per-
ceptual experiences, and emotions, among others. Introspection thus 
understood implies some amount of effort from the introspector (for 
example, directing their attention in the right time and manner). Thus, 
introspective judgments are a kind of cognitive achievement suscepti-
ble to success and failure (and this is true even if the effort is minimal). 
An implication of this way of understanding introspection is that, at 
least sometimes, we undergo conscious experiences that we do not 
(fully) introspect. For example, one does not always direct attention 
towards, and makes introspective judgments about, peripheral vision.5 
                                                 
 
3 Naturally, some philosophers conclude that introspection is special. Here I just 
suggest that assuming introspection is not special is a reasonable starting point.  
4 Many philosophers agree that introspection involves some kind of attention ori-
ented towards conscious experiences. Note that they agree despite espousing very 
different views about introspection (and the mind). To cite just a few, see (Peacocke 
[1998]; Carruthers [2000]; Hatfield [2005]; Rosenthal [2005]; Goldman [2006]; Ryle 
[2009]; Chalmers [2010]; Schwitzgebel [2012]; Wu [2014]; Giustina and Kriegel 
[2017]). 
5 Strictly speaking, a view where introspection and consciousness are not independ-
ent could still embrace this way of understanding introspection. For example, some-
one who holds that all conscious states are introspected could still agree that one 
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In any case, iSDT will try to capture these types of introspective judg-
ments. Relatedly, a theory aiming to calibrate introspection need not 
depend on a specific theory of consciousness, and this is true of the 
theory I develop here. Finally, for reasons of space, I will focus only 
on the introspection of conscious sensory experiences such as pain, 
mental images and perceptual experiences.6  
 
2.1 Infallibility & unreliability 
The GARDEN-VARIETY assumption and this way of understanding in-
trospective judgments are in clear tension with prominent views that 
take introspection to be infallible (self-intimating, transparent, privi-
leged or impervious to error in some other way). A similar tension is 
present too for views that consider introspection to be completely un-
reliable. Both kinds of approach bypass the problem of calibration: if 
introspection is always or never to be trusted, there is no range of op-
eration to be established. Here, I briefly comment on these positions. 
Views that consider introspection to be infallible have a long his-
tory. Descartes, for example, vividly evokes introspective infallibility 
when he writes: ‘I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. 
But I am asleep, so all this is false. Yet I certainly seem to see, to hear, 
and to be warmed. This cannot be false’ (Descartes [1984], AT VII 
29). More recently, Gertler argues that introspection takes place via 
pure demonstrative reference achieved by directing attention to the 
phenomenal contents of our conscious experiences. ‘By appropriately 
attending to the dull throbbing sensation [of a headache], you demon-
stratively pick out the phenomenal content <dull throbbing>’ (Gertler 
[2001], p. 321). Phenomenal contents are supposed to be embedded in 
the introspective judgment ‘it is thus here and now’, thus preventing 
any sort of error when introspecting one’s conscious experiences. Ger-
tler’s understanding of introspection explicitly denies GARDEN-
                                                 
 
introspect more (and hence is more conscious of) the centre of the visual field than 
the periphery.  
6 In principle, iSDT could be extended to other conscious experiences as long as 
they have an intensity dimension.  
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VARIETY, since she thinks introspection works differently from any 
other mental mechanism. Introspectors ‘grasp the content directly […] 
in the sense that there is no causal gap between the referring state and 
its referent, the phenomenal content’ (Gertler [2001], p. 232). Several 
other defences of some sort of introspective infallibility—especially 
about occurrent phenomenal experiences—abound in the recent liter-
ature (Shoemaker [1996]; Chalmers [2003]; Horgan and Kriegel 
[2007]). 
My goal here is not to discuss these views at length. But I do want 
to highlight that introspective infallibility is often defended based on a 
very limited set of examples. It might be tempting to think introspec-
tive judgments are always accurate if the examples one relies on are of 
the type ‘I’m in pain now’, ‘I am seeing a red patch’, or ‘I’m experienc-
ing this’. As Schwitzgebel correctly points out, ‘there is a reason opti-
mists like the example of pain and foveal visual experience of a single 
bright colour. It is hard, seemingly, to go too badly wrong in intro-
specting really vivid, canonical pains and foveal colours. But to use 
these cases only as one’s inference base rigs the game’ (Schwitzgebel 
[2008], pp. 259-60). Once more complex (yet completely common) 
cases are considered, introspection’s infallibility becomes much harder 
to maintain. 
This acute observation about this ‘diet’ of examples, however, need 
not turn us into sceptics about introspection. For instance, Schwitz-
gebel thinks that ‘we make gross, enduring mistakes about even the 
most basic features of our currently ongoing conscious experience (or 
‘phenomenology’)’ (Schwitzgebel [2008], p. 247). Rather than embrac-
ing this equally extreme position, what we need is a principled method 
for calibrating the whole range of reliability of our capacity to intro-
spect. By taking the GARDEN-VARIETY assumption as our starting 
point, we should find it equally implausible that introspection is infal-
lible and that it is always utterly broken. Just as we try to understand 
why perception, memory, decision-making and other cognitive capac-
ities work when they do and why they fail when they do, we should 
find systematic ways to model introspection’s range of operation. In 
any case, this will be my goal here. 
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2.2 Inner sense 
By departing from the tradition that considers introspection infallible, 
iSDT can also abandon a tradition that considers introspection unique 
or special. Rather, iSDT takes introspection to function similarly to 
other faculties—perception in particular—and thus embraces a tradi-
tion that treats introspection as a kind of ‘inner sense’.7 Theories of 
inner sense have many prominent defenders (Armstrong [1968]; Locke 
[1975]; Lycan [1996]; Kant [1998]; Goldman [2006]). Nevertheless, this 
kind of theories has acquired a bad reputation. So bad that philoso-
phers often find appeals to inner sense ‘unpersuasive, even repugnant’ 
(Goldman [2006], p. 225). Against this trend, iSDT aims to become an 
attractive option for modelling introspection. 
Part of the distaste for inner-sense mechanisms stems from com-
mon simplifications by critics and, sometimes, champions too. Arm-
strong, a notable proponent of an inner sense, compares introspection 
to bodily perception because it happens without a ‘proper organ’ and 
its object ‘is private to each perceiver’ (Armstrong [1968], p. 325). 
While it is true that introspection does not have a proper organ, the 
comparison is unfortunate. Critics of inner sense sometimes also base 
their objections on misguided analogies. Hill, for example, writes that 
an inner ‘scanning device is said to stand in much the same relationship 
to sensations as the physical eye does to extramental objects and 
events’ ([1988], pp. 12-3). Neither of these, however, are adequate 
points of similarity between perception and introspection. Rather than 
a literal organ (or lack thereof), it is the type of internal processing they 
carry out what makes perception and introspection similar. 
Hill raises an interesting criticism against inner-sense views. Ac-
cording to him, the inner-sense analogy gives the wrong result: while 
the internal qualities of extramental entities ‘are never affected by their 
coming to stand in [any informational relation to the physical eye]’, 
                                                 
 
7 Others also abandon the infallibility claim or the uniqueness claim or both. To list 
just a handful of recent examples, see (Rosenthal [2005]; Schwitzgebel [2008]; Bayne 
and Spener [2010]; Hohwy [2011]; Reuter [2011]; Giustina and Kriegel [2017]). 
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defenders of an inner-scanning mechanism cannot argue that ‘the in-
ternal qualities of sensations do not change when one scans them’ 
([1988], p. 13). But the inner-sense theorist need not deny that the 
scanning mechanism alters its target states, and she does not need to 
accept either that perceptual processing does not alter its target.8  
On one hand, it is not generally true that detection mechanisms do 
not alter their target objects. Measuring an objects’ temperature with-
out altering it—even if just marginally—is practically impossible. So, 
when detecting our experiences, we alter them. For instance, intro-
specting may make experiences stronger: a pain may become more in-
tense, a mental image may become more vivid, a visual experience may 
become more striking (see section 4 for further discussion of this 
point). This implies that we hardly, if ever, introspect ‘pure’ experi-
ences. This is, of course, the right result (one that Hill himself em-
braces): we cannot know exactly what an unintrospected (that is, an 
unattended) conscious experience is like. How could we if we are not 
introspecting it! If we wanted to say something about ‘pure’ experi-
ences, we would need to rely on memory of an unintrospected experi-
ence. It should be obvious that this opens the possibility of significant 
error.  
On the other hand, the claim that the eye does not alter the internal 
qualities of its objects is somewhat misleading. While perhaps literally 
true, the right comparison between perception and introspection is not 
between the eye and some internal organ. Rather, it is between percep-
tual and introspective processing. Introspection can be successfully 
modelled after perception, but introspection is not perception any 
more than perception is receiving radio signals, the original domain of 
application of SDT models. Moreover, orienting our eyes (foveating) 
and, more importantly, orienting our attention towards an object most 
definitely alter the perceptual representation and perceptual experience 
of seeing that object (Carrasco et al. [2004]; Carrasco [2011]). In sum-
mary, the inner-sense theorist can admit that introspective attention 
                                                 
 
8 Incidentally, there are several points of agreement between iSDT and Hill’s positive 
proposal. For example, he does not think we introspect every conscious experience 
and he allows introspective errors.  
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affects target experiences, but the critic must admit that a fair compar-
ison with perception would highlight that perceptual attention also al-
ters perceptual processing of the target stimulus.  
Shoemaker’s ([1996]) criticism of inner-sense is also worth consid-
ering here. SELF-BLINDNESS occurs when a creature capable of con-
ceiving certain kind of mental facts and phenomena is, nevertheless, 
incapable of gaining introspective access to such mental facts and phe-
nomena: ‘He is in extreme pain, his pains are extremely unpleasant, but 
there is nothing bad about this because he is unaware of his pains […]. 
His pains hurt, but they do not hurt him’ (Shoemaker [1996], p. 275). 
SELF-BLINDNESS, according to Shoemaker, is ‘nonsense’. Instead, he 
defends SELF-TRANSPARENCY, which holds that, necessarily, if you are 
in a mental state M, and various background conditions obtain, and 
you are rational, you will believe you are in M.9 
Inner-sense approaches to introspection deny SELF-TRANSPAR-
ENCY and embrace the possibility of SELF-BLINDNESS. In particular, 
inner-sense views assume that target conscious states exist inde-
pendently from the subject becoming (accurately) aware of them in-
trospectively (for example, if the detection mechanism were absent, 
inoperant, or otherwise faulty).  
As before, the goal here is not to offer an in-depth analysis and 
rebuttal of Shoemaker’s view (Hill ([1988]), Williamson ([2002]) and 
Srinivasan ([2015]), among many others, have offered convincing ar-
guments against SELF-TRANSPARENCY). Rather, I aim to contextualise 
some of iSDT’s assumptions. Contrary to Shoemaker’s suggestions, 
not only some kind of SELF-BLINDNESS is empirically possible, but we 
should also take the intensity of the introspected experiences into ac-
count in our explanations of introspection.  
Recent evidence shows that perceptual states can remain intact 
while self-reflective mechanisms are corrupted. In cases of metacogni-
tive failure, subjects display normal performance in a perceptual task 
at the same time that they display altered self-evaluations of their 
                                                 
 
9 Here I follow Stoljar’s ([Forthcoming]) reconstruction of Shoemaker’s SELF-TRANS-
PARENCY claim. 
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performance in those tasks. These effects have been observed in both 
neuropsychological populations (Fleming et al. [2014]), via causal in-
terventions in neurotypical subjects (Rounis et al. [2010]; Cortese et al. 
[2016]) and via psychophysical manipulations (Morales et al. [Forthco-
ming]; Zylberberg et al. [2012]; Koizumi et al. [2015]; Samaha et al. 
[2016]; Maniscalco et al. [2020]). While these effects do not show com-
plete self-blindness, some of them are not subtle either. For example, 
Fleming and colleagues ([2014]) showed a fifty percent reduction in 
metacognitive efficiency in patients with prefrontal cortex lesions. Im-
portantly, these patients saw the stimuli without any troubles and in a 
completely normal way as revealed by their ability to do the task. As 
this case suggests, metacognitive self-reflecting mechanisms can fail 
while perceptual experiences remain intact.  
The metacognitive ability to assess one’s performance in a percep-
tual task is technically not identical to introspecting the experiences 
one undergoes while doing said task. However, the differences are not 
relevant in practice (Morales and Lau [Forthcoming]). Asking subjects 
to rate confidence in their performance produces virtually identical re-
sults to asking subjects to introspect how visible the stimulus was (Pe-
ters and Lau [2015]). Even though a confidence report may not be a 
perfect substitute for an introspective report about ongoing phenom-
enology, the subjective feeling of having perceived a stimulus is par-
tially supported by our introspective ability to know our own experi-
ences. And this is especially true in introspective-reliant tasks, that is, 
tasks that demand focusing on the quality of one’s experience (as op-
pose to focusing on the stimuli themselves) (Chirimuuta [2014]; 
Spener [2015]). Thus, although distinct in principle, metacognitive fail-
ure in fact provides a window into introspective failure.  
Beyond potential malfunctions of the introspective apparatus, reli-
ability under completely normal circumstances is not constant across 
conditions. Weak pains (or faint mental images or weak perceptual ex-
periences) and strong pains (or vivid mental images or intense percep-
tual experiences) are not introspectable with equal accuracy. Blank 
statements such as SELF-TRANSPARENCY lack crucial information 
about the intensity of the mental state and, therefore, they cannot be 
appropriately evaluated in the iSDT framework (or any framework that 
accepts GARDEN-VARIETY). Even relaxing the modal claim in SELF-
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TRANSPARENCY by substituting ‘necessarily’ for something weaker 
such as ‘in normal cases’ or ‘most of the time’ or even ‘ideally’ is not 
sufficient. The lack of details about the intensity of the experience re-
mains problematic. For example, if mental state M is substituted for ‘a 
very weak pain’, iSDT would not predict that ‘most of the time’ or 
even ‘ideally’ you would believe that you are in (a weak) pain. In con-
trast, iSDT would predict that ‘most of the time’ or ‘ideally’ you acquire 
such a belief when in ‘extreme pain’ (which is closer to Shoemaker’s 
example cited above). But more importantly, this shows that iSDT 
makes distinct predictions about the reliability of introspection de-
pending on the degree of intensity of the targeted experience. 
In the next sections, I will develop the building blocks of the iSDT 
framework, which will allow us to think about introspection in a sys-
tematic way. The framework has a wide scope (it explains success and 
failure), and it is explanatorily illuminating (it explains why these cases 
succeed and fail, and it does so by appealing to a single kind of mech-
anism). Moreover, the framework achieves this with the minimal as-
sumption that introspection is a garden-variety capacity and that, 
thereby, it operates in a similar fashion to the rest of our cognitive 
capacities—perception in particular. 
 
3 Signal Detection Theory 
Consider the next scenarios. They all assume that a man is in an alley 
and that his face is in your direct line of sight. 
 
BRIGHT ALLEY: You walk by an alley late at night. The alley’s lamp is 
on, so it is easy for you to see a man next to the dumpster. His face 
looks bright, and the contours of his facial features look well-defined. 
You are confident you are seeing someone. 
DARK ALLEY: The alley’s lamp is off. The man’s face looks dark, and 
the contours of his face look ill-defined. It is hard for you to see him. 
You mistakenly categorize his face as being just a shadow and judge 
that the alley is empty. However, you are not confident.  
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DARK ALLEY + NEWS: Identical situation to DARK ALLEY except that 
you heard that a robber is on the run in the neighbourhood. You cat-
egorize the ill-defined shadow as someone’s face. Note that the man’s 
face in the dark is visually processed in exactly the same way it is pro-
cessed in DARK ALLEY. The only difference here is that knowing about 
the robber changes how you categorize the same evidence, thereby 
changing your perceptual judgment. You are still not confident about 
what you see. 
 
These scenarios illustrate three paradigmatic features of perception 
that SDT can model successfully: sensitivity, response bias & confi-
dence. In a nutshell, according to SDT, perceptual judgments are de-
termined by sensory sensitivity (namely, the ability to discriminate 
stimuli based on the way these shape a psychological decision space) 
and by response biases (namely, the manner in which the psychological 
space is partitioned to generate possible responses) (Macmillan and 
Creelman [2005]). Paradigmatically, perception is modelled as an ob-
server deciding whether an internal perceptual response p was gener-
ated by a stimulus class S1 (for example, stimulus absent, line oriented 
left, etc.) or S2 (for example, stimulus present, line oriented right, etc.). 
The perceptual response corresponds to the strength of sensory evi-
dence, in turn modulated by the intensity of the stimulus. A funda-
mental assumption of SDT is that, across repeated presentations of 
the same stimulus class, the perceptual response can have different 
values due to ever-present random noise (either in the stimulus or in 
perceptual processing). The dimension along which the values of the 
internal response are distributed is called ‘the decision axis’. The per-
ceptual response p in any given case can be thought of as being drawn 
from either a noise or a signal-plus-noise distribution (Figure 1).  
 
 




Figure 1. Signal detection theory model. 
SDT models perception as a decision about perceptual internal evidence. Ob-
servers decide whether an evidence sample was drawn from class S1 (red distri-
bution) or S2 (blue). Perceptual judgments depend on whether the drawn sample 
is below or above a decision criterion (solid vertical line). If the sample is below 
the criterion, the observer selects S1; if it is above the criterion, the observer 
selects S2. There are two kinds of correct trials. Correct rejections take place 
when the observer selects S1 when the sample is drawn from the S1 distribution; 
selecting S2 when a sample is drawn from the S2 distribution is called a hit. There 
are two kinds of incorrect trials. Misses take place when S2 stimuli are catego-
rized as coming from the S1 distribution; false alarms occur when S1 stimuli are 
judged to come from S2. 
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Figure 2. SDT models of alley scenarios.  
The distance between the red (noise) and blue (signal-plus-noise) curves repre-
sents the observer’s perceptual sensitivity (d’) (for distributions with the same 
variance). A. BRIGHT ALLEY. The internal perceptual response (star) produced 
by the stimulus (the man) in a given trial crosses both the detection criterion and 
the right confidence criterion producing an accurate judgment with high confi-
dence. B. DARK ALLEY. The observer inaccurately judges the alley as being 
empty, albeit with low confidence because the perceptual response falls between 
the left-most confidence criterion and the detection criterion. C. DARK ALLEY 
+ NEWS. An identical perceptual response with an identical sensitivity as in 
DARK ALLEY produces an accurate detection (still with low confidence) due to 
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3.2 Response bias 
Because the distributions overlap, it is always possible for a given value 
of p to have been generated by S1 or S2. To make a perceptual judg-
ment, observers classify p as S2 if it exceeds a response criterion c (solid 
lines in Figure 1 and 2), and as S1 otherwise. Importantly, whereas 
sensitivity is a function of stimulus properties and perceptual pro-
cessing (typically) beyond observer’s control, c reflects a response strat-
egy largely determined by the observer’s priors, preferences, goals and 
other traits (for example, maximizing the probability of responding 
correctly, maximizing rewards, degree of risk aversion, perceptual bi-
ases, etc.). 
Importantly, as the DARK ALLEY and the DARK ALLEY + NEWS sce-
narios illustrate, sensitivity and response bias are independent from 
each other (Figure 2B & 2C). While preserving identical sensitivity (the 
distance between the distributions’ means is the same), an identical 
perceptual response can yield different perceptual judgments due to 
changes in the detection criterion. In DARK ALLEY + NEWS, the crite-
rion for detecting the presence of someone lurking in the alley be-
comes more liberal (Figure 2C). This criterion change results in 
changes in response accuracy in these trials (even if overall sensitivity 
remains the same): a correct classification in DARK ALLEY + NEWS (hit) 
and an incorrect classification in DARK ALLEY (miss). 
 
3.3 Confidence 
Perceiving, or more specifically, classifying perceptual evidence p as S1 
or S2, always involves some degree of uncertainty. Confidence in one’s 
perception can also be characterized as resulting from a criterion-set-
ting process (Figure 2; dashed lines). Confidence in a perceptual deci-
sion is determined by setting confidence criteria that further partition 
the decision space. When the perceptual response crosses both the de-
tection criterion and the confidence criterion, observers report detect-
ing the stimulus with high confidence (Figure 2A). If the perceptual 
response crosses the detection criterion but fails to cross the confi-
dence criterion, observers correctly report detecting the target but with 
low confidence (Figure 2C). An analogous explanation in the other 
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direction applies too. Observers report not detecting the stimulus with 
low confidence if the perceptual response crosses the left confidence 
criterion, but not the detection criterion (Figure 2B). When the internal 
response is too weak to cross any criteria, observers judge with high 
confidence that the stimulus is absent. 10  
This brief introduction to SDT highlights the crucial role the inter-
nal perceptual response plays in modelling perceptual judgments. To 
successfully explain introspection using insights from SDT, iSDT 
needs an equivalent notion: an internal introspective response. In the 
next section, I offer a plausible candidate for a basis of introspective 
responses: conscious experience intensity or what I call ‘mental 
strength’.  
 
4 Mental Strength and Introspective Internal        
Responses 
The targets of perception (stimuli) have degrees of strength: the face 
of a man in an alley can be more or less bright, sounds can be more or 
less loud, heat patches can be more or less hot, and so on. Stimuli in 
each modality may be strong (or weak) along more than one dimen-
sion; for example, visual stimuli strength depends on brightness, con-
trast, saturation, etc. SDT postulates that after hitting our senses, stim-
uli produce an internal perceptual response of, ceteris paribus, propor-
tional strength. In other words, strong stimuli typically produce strong 
perceptual responses and weak stimuli typically produce weak 
                                                 
 
10 Whether this uncertainty is reflected in subjects’ phenomenology or not is a matter 
of current debate. Recently, the question of whether there is perceptual confidence 
or more generally whether perceptual experiences reflect the probabilistic nature of 
perception, has been widely discussed (Morrison [2016]; Munton [2016]; Morrison 
[2017]; Block [2018]; Beck [2019]; Gross [2020]; Siegel [2020]). Here, I am neutral as 
to whether perceptual phenomenology reflects perceptual confidence or not. Confi-
dence judgments could be based on perceptual confidence but the SDT apparatus 
does not require this to be the case. For a discussion on the relation between confi-
dence and consciousness, see (Morales and Lau [Forthcoming]). 
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perceptual responses. As explained in section 3, the probability of 
making an accurate perceptual judgment largely correlates, ceteris pari-
bus, with the strength of the internal perceptual response (Figure 3A).   
 
 
Figure 3. Internal responses as modelled by SDT and iSDT.  
A. SDT. When perceiving a stimulus, its intensity largely modulates (but does 
not determine) the strength of the internal perceptual response in the perceiver. 
Perceptual accuracy is largely driven by the strength of the internal perceptual 
response (perceptual signal-to-noise ratio). B. iSDT. iSDT offers an analogous 
explanation. When introspecting a conscious experience, its intensity or mental 
strength largely modulates (but does not determine) the strength of the internal 
introspective response in the introspector. Introspective accuracy is largely 
driven by the strength of the internal introspective response (introspective sig-
nal-to-noise ratio). Dotted arrows indicate non-deterministic modulation. Solid 
thick arrows indicate the target of each capacity.  
 
To model introspective sensitivity the way SDT models perceptual 
sensitivity, iSDT needs a functional analogue of internal perceptual re-
sponses. These are postulates of SDT (hidden variables) to explain 
perception, and hence iSDT can also postulate an internal introspec-
tive response that plays an analogous role when modelling introspec-
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According to iSDT, the intensity of conscious experiences—their 
mental strength—modulates the strength of introspective responses, 
which, in turn, modulate the accuracy of introspective judgments. 
Conscious experiences vary in their degree of intensity. Pains can be 
stronger or weaker, mental images can be more or less vivid, percep-
tual experiences can be more or less intense (Figure 3B). iSDT relies 
on this obvious fact about our conscious experiences to calibrate in-
trospective reliability.11 
Mental strength is the phenomenal magnitude of conscious experi-
ences. As such, the degree of strength of a conscious experience is its 
degree of phenomenal intensity. It increases from zero, as it were, 
when the conscious experience has not yet arisen, and grows in certain 
time to a given measure. Different degrees of mental strength result in 
different degrees with which mental events make their way to our con-
sciousness. To express these same ideas slightly differently, mental 
strength is the degree of prominence that a conscious experience has 
in one’s phenomenal field at a given time.12 Thus, an intense pain ‘takes 
over’ a larger portion of one’s phenomenal field than a mild pain; a 
vivid mental image has more mental strength than a faint one; an ex-
perience as of a loud sound has more mental strength than an experi-
ence as of a quiet sound.13  
                                                 
 
11 How do we know that conscious experiences have degrees of intensity? One may 
worry that if we know this introspectively, then any explanation of introspective ac-
curacy based on mental strength may be compromised. I do not think we need to 
worry about this. You may fail to accurately perceive the exact brightness (and other 
properties) of a series of stimuli and yet accurately (and confidently) perceive that 
they differ along the brightness dimension. Inaccurate perception does not preclude 
us from perceiving that a series of stimuli differ among themselves in the misper-
ceived dimension. Similarly, we could fail to introspect the intensity (and other prop-
erties) of our experiences and yet accurately (and confidently) introspect that they 
have different intensities. It is just this relatively uncontroversial fact about the de-
grees of intensity of conscious experiences that iSDT relies on. 
12 See Hill’s ([1988]) ‘volume control hypothesis’ for a similar description of mental 
strength as variations in the prominence of a conscious experience in the phenome-
nal field.  
13 Kant seems to hold a similar view regarding conscious intensive magnitudes in 
both the Critique of Pure Reason (‘The anticipation of perception’) and in his Lectures 
on Metaphysics: ‘For example, when a representation has inhibited many others, we 
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Strong stimuli normally produce experiences with a strong internal 
response and, in turn, with strong mental strength (and vice versa for 
weak stimuli) (Peters and Lau [2015]).14 Under normal circumstances, 
the larger a (potential) tissue damage is, the stronger the pain. The 
same applies for perception: typically, the stronger the stimulus, the 
stronger the perceptual experience. In visual imagery there is no exter-
nal stimulation, but the clearer, sharper, more detailed and vivid the 
imagined objects are, the more intense the visual image tends to be 
overall. 
This correlation, however, does not always hold. Ever-present 
noise, the subject’s overall internal state, deployed attention, familiarity 
with the stimuli, and other circumstances can weaken or even reverse 
this correlation. For example, there is no tissue to be (potentially) dam-
aged in a missing limb, and yet, phantom limb pains can be intense. 
Conversely, when adrenaline is really high, large tissue damage may 
produce little to no pain. Similarly, a vivid mental image of a very faint 
candle flame in a dark room lacks clear details by necessity (otherwise 
it would not be a mental image with those contents).  
The intensity of perceptual experiences can be similarly decoupled 
from the stimulus intensity that generate them. Extreme silence pro-
duces intense auditory experiences (Sorensen [2009]; Cox [2014]). 
Something similar happens in the visual domain during ‘subjective 
                                                 
 
say that this has made a great impression’ (cited in Longuenesse [1998], p. 320). Lon-
guenesse’s commentary of this passage is illuminating: ‘Even states of consciousness 
can thus be [...] compared as to their magnitude. A representation is “more or less 
intense” according to the multiplicity of representations it inhibits; a very great pain 
makes one deaf and blind toward any other representation’ (Longuenesse [1998], p. 
320). 
14 What exactly makes internal perceptual responses conscious is a matter of conten-
tion in the philosophy and science of consciousness. This is not the place to take a 
stance in that debate since all we need is that there is a rough correlation in normal 
cases between stronger internal perceptual responses and more intense conscious 
experiences. Even though different views disagree about the exact conditions that 
make this correlation possible or the conditions under which it breaks down, most 
views would admit that a stronger internal perceptual response results in a more 
intense experience. 
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inflation’ (Knotts et al. [2019]).15 Peripheral vision is not as rich as fo-
veal vision, which results in weaker internal responses pertaining to 
peripheral stimuli. Subjects may nonetheless enjoy intense and detailed 
experiences in the periphery—sometimes even more than in foveal re-
gions (Odegaard et al. [2018]). Subjective inflation can even make sub-
jects fail to notice drastic changes that impoverish stimuli in the pe-
riphery (Cohen et al. [2020]). Naturally, these inflated, more intense 
experiences do not reflect the true nature of the stimulus. Peripheral 
vision rarely feels drastically impoverished: it is not experienced in 
black and white or with dramatically washed-out colours, and people 
are normally confident—in fact, overconfident—about their discrimi-
nation capacities in peripheral vision. Nevertheless, peripheral percep-
tion is in fact drastically impoverished (for example, colour discrimi-
nation is poor). This is a clear case where the internal perceptual re-
sponse is weak and yet mental strength is strong.  
Alternatively, blindsight patients display highly accurate uncon-
scious perception (which requires strong perceptual responses) that, 
however, does not lead to a conscious experience (and, thereby, mental 
strength is lacking altogether) (Weiskrantz [1986]).16  
Relatedly, internal responses with identical signal-to-noise ratios 
may create experiences with different degrees of mental strength. In a 
recent experimental paradigm called ‘matched-performance/different-
confidence’, specifically-designed stimulus pairs yield matched perfor-
mance in an experimental task while producing significant differences 
in subjects’ confidence ratings in their performance (Koizumi et al. 
[2015]; Samaha et al. [2016]; Maniscalco et al. [2020]). Matched perfor-
mance is achieved by matching the signal-to-noise ratio of two stimuli 
that, nevertheless, differ in their overall energy. These stimuli generate 
matched internal perceptual responses, thus making equally difficult to 
discriminate the signal. But, at the same time, the stimulus with more 
overall energy looks more intense (for example, the contrast looks more 
                                                 
 
15 See (Abid [2019]) and (Knotts et al. [2020]) for a recent debate.  
16 Note that this is true even if blindsight is reinterpreted as qualitatively degraded 
conscious vision (Phillips [2020]). 
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marked).17 Likely, this increase in mental strength is part of what makes 
subjects rate their otherwise identical performance with higher confi-
dence.  
Following these perceptual scenarios, iSDT postulates that internal 
introspective responses mostly (but not solely) are modulated by the 
strength of conscious experiences. In normal cases, intense experi-
ences produce strong introspective responses. But due to noise, a weak 
experience could occasionally generate a strong introspective re-
sponse, or a strong experience could occasionally generate a weak in-
trospective response. Following the perceptual case, iSDT stipulates 
that there is a close modulation of introspective responses by mental 
strength, but not a perfect correlation. Moreover, since mental 
strength does not always depend on stimulus intensity, the strength of 
introspective responses does not always depend on stimulus intensity 
either. (See next section for examples.) 
The details of a theory of mental strength need not be further spec-
ified here. All we need to sketch a model of introspective accuracy is 
the notion of an introspective response that is modulated by the inten-
sity of conscious experiences, which I have provided here. 
 
5 Introspective Signal Detection Theory 
5.1 A case study: pain 
We now have the necessary building blocks to present iSDT and how 
it models introspective sensitivity (as well as response bias and confi-
dence) in a systematic manner. I start with pain introspection as a case 
study. In the next section, I expand the framework to introspection of 
visual imagery and perceptual experiences.  
                                                 
 
17 For an example of this kind of stimuli, see (Samaha et al. [2016], Figure 1A)  
https://tiny.cc/sampleMPDC.  
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Consider the following scenarios, all of which assume you are in fact 
experiencing pain:18  
 
STRONG PAIN: You wake up with a very strong toothache. You 
rush to the dentist. They ask if you are sure you are in pain. You 
introspect your experience, and accurately judge that you are in-
deed experiencing a strong dental pain. You are highly confi-
dent. The dentist’s question even seems odd—of course you are 
confident you are in strong pain!  
MILD PAIN: An hour after taking powerful painkillers, your 
toothache becomes quite mild. When you introspect, you hon-
estly—albeit inaccurately—judge that you are not in pain any-
more. When the dentist asks if you are sure, the question does 
not seem as odd as before: you are legitimately not completely 
sure (or, in any case, your confidence is lower than in STRONG 
PAIN).  
MILD PAIN + FAMILIARITY: This scenario is identical to MILD 
PAIN (by stipulation, the intensity of the pain is identical in both 
scenarios). Here, however, you are familiar with dental pains. 
And because you have experienced them before, you know it 
usually takes several hours for the pain killers to make them go 
completely away. This time you accurately introspect that you 
are still in pain, but you are not very confident. 
Now consider the following scenario, which assumes that you are 
not experiencing any pain: 
 
DENTAL FEAR: You go to the dentist for a routine clean up. You 
cannot experience any pain because you are under a powerful 
                                                 
 
18 For simplicity, in what follows I discuss pain detection (whether you are or not in 
pain), but the iSDT machinery can be equally applied to discrimination (for example, 
whether a pain is throbbing or stabbing).  
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local anaesthetic. But you have always been really scared of these 
procedures. The dentist turns on their loud and scary instru-
ments, and as they approach your mouth, you start to closely 
monitor your experience. Suddenly, you yelp and report feeling 
an intense pain. The dentist is confused: not only you are under 
the anaesthetic, but they have also not even touched you yet.19 
STRONG PAIN—and to some extent MILD PAIN + FAMILIARITY—
seem quite plausible, but, admittedly, MILD PAIN and DENTAL FEAR 
may strike some as counterintuitive. How could you be in pain and 
miss it! How could you not be in pain and think you are! The intuitive-
ness of these and other cases, however, cannot be assessed introspec-
tively under risk of getting them wrong (the GARDEN-VARIETY as-
sumption makes this an open possibility). Introspective inaccuracies 
are normally not accessible through introspection, and thus it might 
never seem to oneself that an introspective mistake is taking place. In-
trospective mistakes are also not (easily) corrigible by others (Rorty 
[1970]; Alston [1971]; Dennett [2002]; Langland-Hassan [2017]), un-
like perceptual errors which can easily be pointed out by someone else. 
Thus, intuition, introspection, or the lack of correction from others 
are not good routes to discover introspective errors or whether they 
are possible. In contrast, a wide-scope and illuminating theory should 
allow us to reason through these scenarios and establish how they 
work in a principled manner. The purpose of introducing these sce-
narios—some quite normal, some prima facie far-fetched albeit per-
fectly consistent with GARDEN-VARIETY—is to show how iSDT can 
explain all of them in a systematic and principled way.  
                                                 
 
19 Not only anaesthetized patients experience dental fear. Patients whose tooth’s 
nerves have been removed may experience it too (Rosenthal [2005], p. 127; Meier et 
al. [2014]). In these cases, experiencing actual physical pain—let alone intense pain—
should be short from impossible and an alternative explanation for the pain report—
such as an introspective error—is needed.  
 




Figure 4. Pain scenarios as modelled by iSDT. 
A. STRONG PAIN (HIT). The barely overlapping-distributions indicate high sen-
sitivity; a strong introspective response i (blue star indicating i is drawn from the 
signal-to-noise distribution) is accurately and confidently classified as pain. B. 
STRONG PAIN (MISS). Random factors that weaken the introspective response 
during an identical strong pain result in inaccurate introspection albeit with low 
confidence. C. DENTAL FEAR (FALSE ALARM—STRONGER RESPONSE). Fear 
of a dental procedure increases the introspective response of a non-painful ex-
perience (red star indicating i is drawn from the noise distribution). In an ex-
tremely unlikely—but possible—scenario, the introspective response crosses 
both the detection and the confidence criteria resulting in a high-confidence in-
trospective false alarm. D. MILD PAIN (MISS). The average mild pain has a 
weaker internal response, which is depicted here as a lower mean of the signal 
distribution that results in an increased overlap with the noise distribution. This 
indicates lower introspective sensitivity for this kind of pains. Here, a mild pain 
with introspective evidence i (blue star) is missed but with low confidence. E. 
MILD PAIN + FAMILIARITY (HIT—LIBERAL CRITERION). Slightly more liberal 
criteria result in a different (this time accurate) classification of the introspective 
response. Despite the criterion shift, confidence is still low. F. DENTAL FEAR 
(FALSE ALARM—LIBERAL CRITERION). The introspective response of the lack 
of pain (noise) is prototypically weak but, due to fear, here the criteria are dras-
tically shifted, making them more liberal. As in C, the introspector confidently 
misclassifies the introspective response as coming from the signal-plus-noise 
(pain) distribution.  
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Similarly to how perceptual judgments are conceived in SDT, in-
trospective judgments in iSDT are determined by sensitivity (the ability 
to discriminate experiences based on the way these shape a psycholog-
ical decision space) and by response biases (the manner in which the 
psychological space is partitioned to generate possible responses). In-
trospecting is modelled as an introspector deciding whether an internal 
introspective response i was generated by a conscious-experience class 
C1 (for example, ‘pain absent’, ‘burning pain’, etc.) or C2 (for example, 
‘pain present’, ‘stabbing pain’, etc.). The introspective response corre-
sponds to the strength of the introspective evidence, in turn modulated 
by the intensity of the conscious experience (its mental strength). Re-
peated experiences of the same class produce introspective responses 
with different values due to ever-present noise of different sorts. The 
values of the introspective response are distributed across a decision 
axis. The introspective response i in any given case can be thought of 
as being drawn from either a noise or a signal-plus-noise distribution 
(Figure 4).  
 
5.2 Introspective sensitivity 
The distance between the distributions’ means determines the intro-
spector’s sensitivity.20 In STRONG PAIN, the distributions do not over-
lap much, indicating—as expected—high introspective sensitivity for 
strong pains (Figure 4A). An intense dental pain produces a strong 
introspective response that is easy to introspectively judge as a strong 
pain (it is far from the detection criterion).  
Note that the probability of error in STRONG PAIN is very small (the 
area of overlap between the two curves in Figure 4A). Introspective 
errors under these conditions should be quite rare, but not impossible 
(in the same way that it is rare to fail to see a man in a bright alley who 
is in your line of sight, but not impossible). Introspective misses of a 
strong pain, for example, are possible if the introspective response fails 
to cross the detection criterion (STRONG PAIN—MISS, Figure 4B). This 
                                                 
 
20 With background assumptions about the type and variance of the distributions. 
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could happen even if the mental strength of a particular painful expe-
rience is strong. Recall that the relation between mental strength and 
introspective response is not deterministic (Figure 3B). The process 
that gives rise to an introspective response from a strong experience 
may get corrupted, generating a weak introspective response (that is, 
weaker than what that kind of pain normally generates). In a case like 
this, iSDT predicts that although you are experiencing a strong pain 
you introspectively judge that you are not.  
Introspective false alarms of strong pains are possible too (Figure 
4C). The iSDT framework has a straightforward way of accommodat-
ing rare cases such as DENTAL FEAR. Patients’ fear of the procedure in 
conjunction with vibrations produced by the dentist’s instruments 
(noise in iSDT terms) may significantly increase the introspective re-
sponse. This, in turn, produces a pain report even though no pain is 
(could be) experienced under these circumstances (namely, under po-
tent anaesthesia or without dental nerves). (See next subsection for an 
explanation of DENTAL FEAR that appeals to response bias instead of 
increased introspective response.) 
The situation for mild pains is quite different. Mild pains’ mental 
strength tends to be less intense which, in turn, tends to make intro-
spective responses weaker. In consequence, introspective sensitivity in 
MILD PAIN is lower. This can be modelled by decreasing the mean of 
the signal-plus-noise distribution making the distributions overlap 
more (Figures 4D). This does not necessarily entail that false alarms 
and misses are frequent, just that we should expect them to be less rare 
than during introspection of strong pains.  
 
5.3 Introspective response bias 
Another advantage of iSDT is that we can keep introspective sensitiv-
ity and response bias apart. A full calibration of introspection’s range 
of reliability requires us to consider response biases. Accurate and in-
accurate introspective judgments may arise not (only) because of an 
insensitive or inaccurate machinery, they can also take place because 
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of a suboptimal decision rule to classify the relevant introspective sig-
nal.21 
Criterion effects can explain introspective variation, even when 
holding introspective sensitivity fixed. In MILD PAIN and MILD PAIN + 
FAMILIARITY, introspective sensitivity and internal responses are, by 
stipulation, identical (Figures 4D & 4E). And yet, in the former sce-
nario the pain is not introspectively detected while it is in the latter. 
iSDT model these scenarios by shifting the introspective criterion. In 
MILD PAIN + FAMILIARITY, knowledge about the time course of the 
pain killers makes your introspective criterion more liberal; you know 
it is unlikely to be free of pain so quickly, so you are willing to judge 
being in pain with less introspective evidence. In contrast, in MILD 
PAIN you have an unbiased detection criterion, and the same weak in-
trospective response is insufficient for introspecting that you are in 
pain. Finally, the DENTAL FEAR scenario could also be explained by a 
liberal shift in the criterion (Figure 4F), instead of explaining it as an 
increased introspective noise response, as suggested above (Figure 
4C). According to this explanation, the fearful patient is more willing 
to classify as pain a really weak introspective response produced by 
vibrations (introspective noise). Naturally, a combination of an in-
creased introspective response and a more liberal criterion is possible 
too. 
In its current form, iSDT aims to leverage SDT’s insights rather 
than its strict mathematical formulations. A huge advantage of SDT 
for measuring sensitivity is that d’ incorporates both hits and false 
alarms rather than raw percentage correct (section 3.1). iSDT can take 
this insight to refine the way we think about introspective sensitivity 
and response biases beyond a raw accurate/inaccurate classification of 
introspective judgments. One consequence of having a liberal criterion 
in MILD PAIN + FAMILIARITY is not only that existing mild pains are 
more easily detected (higher hit rate), but it also implies that more false 
alarms (less correct rejections) are possible. In other words, someone 
with a liberal introspective criterion might detect more (or even all) 
                                                 
 
21 Perceptual judgments mistakes can often be explained by suboptimal response 
biases too (Rahnev and Denison [2018]). 
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their relevant pain experiences, but they would do so at the cost of 
increasing their false alarms. The opposite is true for someone with a 
conservative criterion: they might rarely (or never) false alarm, but they 
would do so at the cost of increasing the number of times they miss 
some experiences they try to introspect. This is a notable consequence 
of iSDT that can help model introspective behaviour in quite a subtle 
way (perhaps subtler than some current philosophical approaches to 
introspection allow), at the same time that it makes introspection’s ma-
chinery consistent with that of other faculties. 
 
5.4 Introspective confidence 
Infallibilists and sceptics alike have taken excess and lack of confi-
dence, respectively, as evidence to support their views. In contrast, 
iSDT can explain these variations in introspective confidence in a way 
that is largely orthogonal to the reliability of introspection.22 As in 
SDT, confidence in an introspective judgment is a function of the 
strength of the introspective response and the placement of confi-
dence criteria (dashed lines in Figure 4). To capture the common intu-
ition that introspection is, if not infallible, unlikely to be significantly 
wrong most of the time (pace Schwitzgebel and other sceptics), confi-
dence criteria in Figure 4 are placed much closer to the detection cri-
terion than they were in Figure 2 for the perceptual cases. This entails 
introspective responses stay in the high-confidence regions of the in-
trospective decision axis in most cases.  
Importantly, at least sometimes, introspective judgments are made 
with low confidence. This fact has been used by sceptics to mount 
their generalized attacks on introspective reliability (MILD PAIN and 
MILD PAIN + FAMILIARITY [Figures 4D & 4E]). Low confidence, how-
ever, is not necessarily the best guide to establish the reliability of a 
detection system (an obvious fact from the separability of sensitivity 
                                                 
 
22 Some of these confidence variations are reflected in how we talk. For example, 
subjects use ‘I feel pain’ more often to describe minor pains, and ‘I have/am in pain’ 
to describe major pains (Reuter [2011]).  
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and response bias in SDT and iSDT). As the scenarios above show, 
(accurate) introspective judgments may still be made with low confi-
dence even when introspection is highly reliable. Of course, the oppo-
site is true as well, in cases of lower sensitivity subjects may introspect 
with high confidence.  
The analysis of these scenarios shows how iSDT satisfies the two 
desiderata described at the outset. It explains accurate and inaccurate 
introspection under a wide range of circumstances. It also explains why 
this is the case in a systematic and illuminating way by appealing to a 
single kind of explanation that can accommodate otherwise disparate 
cases. Moreover, iSDT can also model (and predict!) important fea-
tures that drive our introspective behaviour such as response biases 
and confidence. Finally, the iSDT framework is also a reminder of the 
importance of letting theory—not intuition or introspection—lead the 
way in how we reason through complex and, at least prima facie, unin-
tuitive scenarios.  
 
6 Beyond Pains: Mental Imagery and Perception 
iSDT models introspection in the same way for any conscious experi-
ence with a degree of intensity (mental strength) that generates an in-
trospective response.23 Here, I can only briefly sketch how to expand 
iSDT to mental imagery and visual perception. Rather than a full treat-
ment of how to apply iSDT to these cases, this sketch is meant as a 
proof of concept that the machinery developed in the previous section 
is helpful for constraining and guiding our thinking about the scope of 
reliability of introspection of other kinds of conscious experience.  
A particularly vivid mental image of a simple object (for example, a 
red apple) is an instance of an intense experience in the imagery do-
main. iSDT predicts cases like this produce strong introspective 
                                                 
 
23 Insofar as an experience has degrees of intensity, it can also be modelled by iSDT. 
This includes itches, emotions, moods, action-awareness, sense of bodily ownership, 
and perhaps thoughts, desires, memories or mental effort (Doulatova [2019]).  
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responses that result in accurate, confident introspective judgments. 
But conjuring vivid mental images is hard. When these are faint, such 
that attending to their features becomes hard, introspecting them may 
become harder too. More inaccurate judgments with lower confidence 
can be expected. It is a matter of contention what makes an image 
more or less vivid, or even what is meant by vividness (Kind [2017]). 
However, it is reasonable to assume that overall mental strength of a 
mental image is the result of an intensity aggregate across several di-
mensions: sensory properties (brightness, loudness, etc.), clarity, num-
ber and salience of details, the feeling of presence of the imagined ob-
jects or events, and the overall stability of the image (Cornoldi et al. 
[1991]). 
Perceptual experiences can be expected to follow exactly the same 
pattern. As discussed above, on one hand, there is a strong link be-
tween perceptual response and mental strength and, on the other hand, 
between mental strength and introspective response. This links predict 
that we are likely to introspect accurately strong experiences of strong 
stimuli. But this link can be broken. In principle, even strong percep-
tual experiences can be inaccurately introspected based on serendipi-
tous weak introspective responses. Moreover, subjective inflation 
(Odegaard et al. [2018]) or Sperling and Sperling-like phenomena 
(Sperling [1960]; Landman et al. [2003]; Sligte et al. [2008]) suggest 
weak perceptual responses can produce experiences with high mental 
strength. iSDT predicts that, in these cases, participants are likely to 
introspect accurately their strong experiences even when their intro-
spective reports do not reflect the weakened nature of external stimuli 
and internal perceptual processing. Thinking about these cases in this 
way allows us to reinterpret phenomenal overflow, according to which 
phenomenology exceeds the capacity of cognitive access (Block 
[1995]; [2007]). On this reinterpretation (Knotts et al. [2019]), subjects 
do not fail to access their phenomenal contents and they do not intro-
spect their experiences inaccurately either. Rather, subjects accurately 
introspect rich (inflated) experiences that are, nevertheless, not sup-
ported by perceptual processing. It is poor perceptual processing what 
explains subjects’ inability to report stimuli accurately, not lack of cog-
nitive access. 




Introspection is signal detection. iSDT explains why, sometimes, we 
introspect accurately; and it also explains why, sometimes, we can ex-
pect introspection to be inaccurate. In doing so, iSDT validates some 
of the intuitions of extreme, incompatible views that hold introspec-
tion is infallible or utterly unreliable. I take this to be a virtue of the 
proposal. A huge advantage of iSDT is that it offers a detailed, system-
atic, naturalistic, and psychologically plausible explanation of intro-
spection’s whole range of reliability. Importantly, it achieves this in an 
illuminating way—it explains why accurate and inaccurate cases take 
place—and it does so in an elegant way appealing to a single mecha-
nism. This introspective machinery operates, at a fundamental level, in 
similar ways to other faculties, such as perception or memory, which 
have been successfully modelled in psychology. By comparing percep-
tual stimulus strength to mental strength, I showed that the tools de-
veloped by signal detection theory provide a novel and solid theoretical 
scaffolding for modelling variations in introspective sensitivity, re-
sponse bias, and confidence.  
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